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the "dialogue of civilizations" invoked by former President Muhammad Khatami against the "clash of civilizations" ambiguously prognosticated by political scientist Samuel Huntington and adopted with élan by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad; (ii) cultural media histories that remind us of many precedents for political cartooning and satire in Iran (and the Muslim world generally), and of the changes in the transnational circuitry which provides opportunistic resources for synergizing conflicts within different social niches and political arenas; (iii) the emotional excess (jouissance, petit à) of cultural politics; and (iv) the philosophical deep play of the aesthetic realm, where "aesthetic" is understood as not just beauty, but as an interactive space between the practical and ethical, between political economy and expressive art, and between individual self-fashioning on the one hand, and, on the other hand, changing symbolic and social orders. 
o.1. preliminary reminder on conflicts within cultural chronotopes
Times are often said to be "out of joint" with contesting ideologies invoking different historical horizons with the same societies. Ideals of one era are invoked alternatively as critique (a sense of difference) and as criticism (impatience) about another era bygone or to come.
Religion, for instance, is out-dated or is yet to be instituted; secular society obversely is the way of the future or is to be overcome. Aflatun],), the idea of a philosopher-king, and genres of manuals for princes (Nzam ul-Mulk, Machiavelli) . Just as Oedipus, Antigone, and Socrates became again key cultural stories used in post-1968 French debates about politics (Leonard 2005) , so too popular film in Iran keeps the luti-jahel-darvish paradigm alive. Just as Sophoclean tragedy is less known in the Islamic world except through Western education, so too the jahel-luti-darvish series of moral types is less well recognized in the West except for fans of Iranian popular films of the 1950s and 1960s (Naficy 2008 forthcoming) , and the exceptional focus on the sufi darvish by people seeking "the mystical wisdom of the East".
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The jahel is an unscrupulous tough guy, the luti has matured into the neighborhood protector and moral hero; the sufi dervish (Pers. darvish), withdraws from the public world of corruption in principled resistance to it (Bateson et al. 1977) . In popular films, the luti-jahel competing pair is as familiar as the eiron-alazon (self-deprecating ironist and bragging poseur) pair in comedy (both Greek and Persian). Both jahel and luti exercise in the sacralized athletic pit (orgowd) of the traditional ritualized gymnasium, the zurkhaneh (literally house of strength; for a description, see Fischer 1973) . The zurkhaneh is presided over on the one hand by the heroic figure of 'Ali, (the first Shi'ite Imam, fourth Sunni caliph), and on the other hand, by Rustam and other pahlavans (champions in warfare and in physical strength) of Firdawsi's national epic, the Shahnameh. In popular tough guy films of the 1960s and 1970s, the struggles between luti and jahel were eulogies for the passing era of lutis and their replacement by amoral modernity dominated by jahels in both neighborhood and national governance [Naficy 2008 forthcoming].
The luti or darvish is the cultural ideal, the jahel the corrupt present reality. The jahel-luti pair are lower class figures, and thus could be used safely as emotional allegories for the state and its leadership. In contemporary diasporic music videos both figures affectionately signify a slightly comic, moral nostalgia, playing upon a newer chrontopoic division between a transnational liberated sensibility and a domestic Iranian caughtness within domestic constraints and internationally sanctions. The external sanctions are U.S. trade embargoes. The domestic constraints are a penal system that rules even behavioral and dress codes.
The luti-jahel pair, like the religious Karbala Paradigm (of struggle for justice against overwhelming evil) of Shi'ite passion plays [Fischer 1980 ], or more quietist sufi resistance to the corruption of the world, continue to provide analogies for politics. More directly, and more emotionally, contested is the notion of a republic. Should the Islamic Republic be more republic (jumhuriye) or more Islamic? Can class-linked religiosities in this Islamic republic be noncoercive? A parallel question exists in United States politics where religion-linked social conservatism has been revived as a voting bloc to coerce all to adhere to the social morality claimed by some to be demanded by fundamentalist (Protestant and Catholic) Christianity. 
Cartoons in the Transnational Circuitry
The transnational circuitry evolves in punctuated phases often marked by dramatic incidents of Kulturkampf or culture wars from which later publicity-and advantage-seeking political actors learn. The Salman Rushdie affair is the most obvious immediate precedessor to the Danish cartoon affair. The stirring up of murderous rage against the author of the novel Satanic Verses was a major test bed of viral vectors traversing social membranes across the globe and acting parasitically within otherwise different social conflicts. The political arenas, social dramas, goals and stakes were different in Bradford (England), Pakistan, India, and Iran.
Iran was the last major player to get in on the act, and its parasitic contribution, in the form of Ayatuallah Khomeini's fatwa, became the most potent transnationally and of least concern internally in Iran. The belatedness of Iran's entry is not so odd, given that Rushdie had won a national prize in Iran for his previous book Shame, a searing satire on Pakistan, and that Satanic Verses made use of well-known Shi'ite hadith and stories in his comic portrait of the nightmares or derangements of migrants in England whose interior struggles braided together Bollywood film images with childhood religious indoctrination. Ayatullah Khomeini's fatwaanathematizing Rushdie for a book few Muslims (whether in England, India, Iran or Pakistan) had read, and most heard of only through bowdlerized excerpts read out by incendiary preachers or through word of mouth -proved infectious among Sunni and Shias around the world, cabdrivers and professors alike.
With the Danish cartoons, the anti-Azeri cartoons in a government-aligned Tehran newspaper, and the Holocaust cartoon contest, Iran continues to be a nodal site, not only in the play of cartooning rickoshay, but in experimentation with the media circuitry. The Holocaust cartoon contest was sponsored by the Tehran municipality and a government aligned newspaper.
These experiments with the media circuits received bully pulpit attention and support from President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamene'i, the Rahbar (Leader, Führer, or Duce, a title apparently increasingly used because of his contested status as the most qualified ayatullah or religious expert of the time, which was the original qualification for being the constitutional velayat-e faqih).
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While the Rushdie affair dramatized the transnational circuitry's power to transfer the frenzy of position-taking from one political arena to another, the more recent cartoon affairs suggest a new phase in the turbulence of the transnational circuitry, focusing attention on how such circulating controversies help and hinder the construction of global, national, and local public spheres. The construction of civil society is still centrally on the agenda in Iran, re-ignited as a goal of the revolution since the calls of President Khatami for open civil society, respect for civil rights, and dialogue of civilizations, and continuing in student, worker, and women's protests against restrictions imposed under President Ahmadinejad. The construction of civil society is also on the agenda again in Europe in a way that has not been the case since perhaps the time of the French Revolution. The furor stirred up by the Danish imams transnationally crystallized the stakes for many Europeans.
I will try to probe these questions and their complications from a perspective that respects the struggles in Iran. These struggles include those within the clerical elite, those within the larger intelligentsia, and those within the society at large that has, with all its failings, numerous elections to its credit and a taste for participatory forms of governance that will not rest. It is notable in this context, as Danny Postel (2006) has recently argued, that unlike so-called progressives in the West, Iranian thinkers tend to be attracted more to liberal political theorists than to revolutionary ones in part because of the policing of opinion by revolutionary ideologies and movements. Civil society is on the agenda, under siege, restriction, and tutelage. The vital role of dowrehs (discussion circles), as well as public demonstrations, efforts by human rights lawyers, blogs, women's rights organizations, and film continues. Many of these are networked to the transnational circuitry. The dowreh chronicled in Azar Naficy's controversial Reading Lolita in Tehran was stimulated by Naficy's attendance, with Moroccan and other Middle Eastern activists and women's groups, in the fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in1995.
With regard to the cartoon controversies, and the response in Iran by the holding of the Occupation and Holocaust cartoon contests, it seems necessary to go back over again, briefly, but with a more complicated eye, the Danish cartoon controversy itself. It has been argued, correctly I think, by Mark Peterson (2006) , that we need to recognize the sophistication and irony 8 of Iranian responses to the Danish affair (and more generally in its geopolitical theatrics.) It is certainly true that the Danish imams and the Iranian cartoon competition organizers contribute to the global public sphere by pointing out blind spots in many Western secular positions. At the same time two other features are equally critical. First, Ahmadinejad and Khamene'i used the cartoons in a bread and circus tactic of domestic political distraction and consolidation, and to assert Iran's independence on the world stage. Second, the interventions of the Danish imams and the Iranian cartoon contest organizers do not themselves seem to pass the tests of Islamic ethics or democratic responsibility. Such cultural politics is, of course, also deeply emotional. In the current case, the emotions both got out of control, causing, some calculate, over 139 deaths.
This should be a potent warning about demagogic politics. Theatrics may be required in politics, but not all theatrics need play with fire in contexts where the fire can get out of hand.
In a philosophical register, there is here a deep play of the aesthetic realm, where "aesthetic" is understood not as just beauty, but as an interactive space between the practical and the ethical, between political economics and art, and between self-fashioning individuals and always changing symbolic and social orders. The tools required are not just media circuit analysis, nor just symbolic and tactical political analysis, both of which are crucial, but also hermeneutic interpretation, which itself is always an interactive space of cultural and moral struggle, and a trial in both the procedural-justice sense and the religious-moral sense. I
The Jyllands-Posten cartoons and the Activation of Transnational Circuitry
As political cartoonist Daryl Cagle observes, at first the argument that free speech also requires the exercise of prudent responsibility in politically charged settings garnered sympathy for the liberal political judgment that the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and its cultural editor, Fleming Rose, had acted imprudently in soliciting artists to draw something about the meaning of Islam to them in the alleged context of the fear of Danish artists to undertake the illustration of a children's book on the life of Muhammad. Hervick (2007) has questioned the validity of this "context story" used by Jyllands-Posten to justify its solitation of the cartoons; and drawn attention to the explicit anti-Muslim provocateur stance of some of the cartoonists, the There is nothing wrong with taboos to instill a ritual sense of spirituality, but once they are turned into social controls they become something quite different. Indeed many ritual and spiritual traditions are highly self-conscious about the visceral as well as cognitive-moral importance of purification and self-discipline through a system of voluntarily accepted taboos, psychologies, and how they may react. The public sphere is not just a "regulatory ideal" space for for rational argument and play of ideas; it is also a moral sphere in the Kantian sense of becoming the best we collectively can be (which in the international realm meant for Kant not to so defeat an enemy that all future reconciliation becomes impossible). Democracy is not just elections (as anti-democrats tend to use them), but institutionalized systems of checks and balances, transparency where possible, accountability and public review of policy directions.
Emotions of cultural politics: jouissance and the petit a.
The revolutionary 
The Danish cartoons themselves
The twelve Similarly the Ottoman imagery signals more politics than religion.
But most important here is the stirring up of violence by the interventions of the the Danish imams, a playing with populist fire, that they attempted eventually and ineffectively to call off. They had first appealed to the Danish courts, which had they not understood before hand (a failing of the immigration process) did not consider these quite mild cartoons any kind of hate speech, or anything not concerned with the appropriate exercise of free speech about the basic protections of the democratic public sphere, something that the imams as leaders of their community should be defenders of, as they claim in their 43 page dossier to be.
x A second cartoon, also mildly insulting perhaps, though it can be interpreted otherwise, is actually a mild commentary on old iconic traditions. Poul Erik Poulson drew a figure with golden horns which almost touch in a halo. One thinks of the long tradition in Europe of depicting Moses with horns, and of the Islamic epithets in the Qur'an and elsewhere of Alexander the Great as two-horned (Dhul-Qarnayn), meaning a militant but righteous king, one who traveled from West to East (the two horns of the world). Dhul-Qarnayn is a term of approbation, not of denigration.
In the Poulson cartoon, after all, the horns are golden, and in their horizontal orientation clearly not beastial. The figure itself clad in simple tunic and shalvar is hardly threatening, in no way the image of a terrorist.
The most interesting cartoon in the context of the newspaper's original request is Arne
Sorenson's of a cartoonist (himself), the shades drawn, sweating nervously, as he tries to create a drawing of an Arab man's head. This is the democratic concern that Muslim militants have used violence to back up a claim that their religiosity is different from anyone else's, and should be given special protection from discussion in the public sphere. This is the central concern that the Jyllands-Posten cultural editor used for soliciting the cartoons in the first place, and that the courts and Prime Minister of Denmark used to invoke the principle of free speech. The Prime
Minister was wrong, as a simple matter of political prudence, to refuse to meet with the ambassadors of a number of Muslim countries to discuss the matter, particularly since their request referred to a climate of Muslim-baiting and did not mention the cartoons specifically. The imams and leaders of the Muslim community were certainly within their democratic rights and obligations to publicly raise the issue of negative discourse against Muslims in Denmark, and when these initiatives were unsuccessful to "internationalize" and embarrass Denmark in the court of world opinion or through enrolling protest elsewhere in the world.
At the same time, the Jyllands-Posten was equally within it democratic rights and obligations as part of the fourth estate to object to the chilling effect on free speech of Muslim violence in relation to speech. Jens Julius' cartoon of a turbaned figure in heaven protesting as a line of suicide bomber "martyrs" try to enter, "we have run out of virgins," would not be out of place in Iranian and other Muslim world newspapers. Of course, it is often allowable in humor for insiders to say things that are not allowed to outsiders, but this doesn't really seem to rise to that level. Unfortunately the cartoon is labeled "Muhammad," an unnecessary specification, and the cartoon would be better without it. Merely by itself the mytheme of virgins in heaven for martyrs is a feature of popular Islamic culture, now politicized in an age when suicide bombing has been adopted by the AfghanPakistani Taliban and militant Palestinians, much to the distress of many Muslim parents who worry about the pressures on their teenaged sons (and some daughters). In Iran, it is a source of some bitterness by veterans of the Iran-Iraq war who feel abandoned and betrayed by a society that often does not pay attention to their injuries and sacrifices.
Five of the cartoons are actually sympathetic to the Imams' complaint, and could be taken to show that Jyllands-Posten was not pursuing an anti-Muslim or anti-immigrant campaign.
They are, if one likes, self-reflexive , metacommentaries about themselves.
Lars Refin has drawn a resolutely multilingual, multicultural cartoon. It shows an immigrant boy in jeans and trainers who has written on a blackboard in Persian. In the caption, in English, he Still it had a serious cultural politics edge. It was part of a longer term effort to carve out a voice and extend its cultural reach. Most interesting in this latter politics is the effort to enroll cartoonists around the world. At issue is as much the global as the domestic public sphere.
Iran moves then to the center of a network of opportunities, not as a prime mover, but as a skillful player using the opportunities presented, one however that is also contested internally in Iran.
The Iranian Theater: Sponsoring Cartoons, Politics of
Cultural Irony, Playing with the Petit a.
Really good political cartoons are more than single-eyed partisan attacks: they exploit the petit a, the parallax gap, the Gestallt switching of visual puns such as the famous rabbit-duck illusion. In so doing, they also expose surplus enjoyment, the excess over rational prudence that both compels obsessive (often self-destructive) repetition, and is a surplus that can be manipulated, put to political use for good (analytic ends), and for ill (demagogic stirring up, or justifying, crowd behavior),often through repetition in slightly variant viral forms. Humor, as
Freud, pointed out can have an aggressive structure whereby the teller of a joke enrolls a listener by assuming a commonality of presuppositions and creating an in-group that excludes the butt of the joke. Such aggression can be undone when the presuppositions are exposed, are contested, or are turned against the speaker.
Although cartoons often trade on single-mindedness -Charlie Brown never learns that Lucy will snatch the ball away just before he kicks it even through she promises not to do it again, repeatedly; cartoons characters are often defined by single passions, playing out to exhaustion or self-destruction. The analytic work of cartoons place tensions or conflicts into visual formats, often using the techniques of dreamwork: condensation, displacement, puns, rebus, allegory.
They can be diffractive, rather than merely stereotypic, diffracting reality (mirroring it but at an angle), revealing neuroses, obsessions, displacements, secondary rationalizations. Often, they can attract at least a wry smile of acknowledgment on the part of the target. They are in that sense binocular, juxtaposing opposing perspectives in ways that can be acknowledged by both.
They can help to release anger rather than stoking it, reminding people of other perspectives, reminding them to lighten up, to take their obsessions with a grain of salt, to return to negotiation with others rather than turning ever more inward in solipsistic hurt. Such reflexive forms of intellectual work are accomplished with great sophistication within cultures, but become troubling across cultural misunderstandings.
It is precisely to such crossings of cultural boundaries that the cartoons boomeranging around the global circuitry speak. If they are deployed merely as a game of dozens -insult contests -they primarily build up in-group versus out-group walls. But if their satire is deployed more subtly they can perform upsets of relations of power, reframing an action in ways that embarrass and make an actor change, making what seems ordinary and natural no longer a matter of course, or at least making the more powerful for a moment reflect upon how those relations of power, injustice, and so on, are felt or viewed by others, how they are not just rewards of playing the game well. Minorities and people living under repressive regimes often develop such humor in ways that position themselves as the butt of the joke, but subtly also try to address the holders of power to gain recognition. Naji al-Ali's widely disseminated little Hanzala is such a figure, a little boy seen from the back, almost always with hands clasped behind his back, in a pose of just watching, a figure of conscience. Hanzala means "bitterness" and Naji al-Ali, a
Palestinian from Galilee who grew up in a refugee camp in Lebanon, said the little boy was himself as a child expelled from Palestine, and that it functioned as his conscience, preventing his soul from making mistakes, and as a bold witness to history. It is all that, but as a figure it is mainly an icon of the self-reflective gaze, a figure of conscience. The gesture of the hands behind the back is universal, and hence provides a kind of uncanny doubleness of the uncomfortable gaze, of being watched, as actions of occupation, trauma, injustice, inequality, unfold, eliciting the interrogatory, "Just what is going on here!" The same would be the case were the little figure deployed watching the cartoon contest. Although one never sees the face, it expresses what Levinas calls the demand of the other, the call of the face of the other, an ethical response, to which one may not be able to respond right now, but whose call will not go away.
The Azeri Cartoons
In Khamene'i's public speech in the aftermath. The first panel, the only cartoon described in the international press and on-line reports, is of a girl saying saying "cockroach" in different ways in
Persian to an uncomprehending cockroach, and the latter replies, "What?" in Turkish but written in English lettering, which makes it seem like a mindless ethnic joke.
The anthropologist Fereydoun Safizadeh (2006) , who happened to be in the area at the time, provides both a richer account both of the content of the drawings and accompanying text, and the dynamics of the riots. The title of the cartoon series is, "What should we do that the cockroaches don't turn us into cockroaches." The text begins with a story about a new version (using the English word "version" transliterated into Persian script) of cockroach that has arrived in Iran (from the United States?), and that one should deal with it at first by dialogue and only if that does not work due to the incomprehension across linguistic grammars (the coded language of propaganda, of American cultural warfare using slogans of fostering pro-democracy movements, as had been done in Eastern Europe, but in fact meaning destabilization by stirring ethnic unrest), only then with violence.
It is no surprise that the Turks from Azarbaijan found this insulting, targeted at them, overdetermining any effort to read it as about American foreign policy, because it trades upon a long history of ethnic jokes that Turks are slow, speak Persian with an accent, and upon the ever encroaching isogloss of Turkish speakers moving eastwards and up the class hierarchy from the bazaar and servant classes of Tehran. But the cockroach theme is far more disturbing, for anyone familiar with Nazi and other racist imagery. And the cartoons give no relief from this darker set of meanings. Safizadeh notes that while the first cartoon shows the little girl talking to a coachroach seated at a miniature chair and desk, the following ones show cockroaches coming from toilets and eating human waste.
Recuperation by the state was slow but harsh. As described in greater detail by Safizadeh, students photocopied the images, and passed word around by text messaging and mobile phone. Demands were made for an apology from the newspaper, Iran, an official organ of the government. When this demand was rejected, demonstrations moved out from the bazaar and university. The governor-general refused to meet with the demonstrators, who proceeded to break shop windows and burn police vehicles and banks. In response, the government shut down mobile phone service, and riot police and "brown shirt" paramilitary were flown in. In Urmieh the television station was set on fire. 
Holocaust Cartoon Contest
If the Azeri cartoon and riot social drama was rapidly put to use by the national state and allow the slurs and injustices to go unchallenged. Arendt is a philosopher of the "human condition in its plurality." It is the plurality that is at issue again today in Iran, in the Islamic world generally, but also in Europe and the U.S., and in the transnational public sphere.
Would that all wars were cartoon wars. Would that sensitivities could be easily relieved with humor, but humor too is infected by the relations of trust, understanding, and protection of relatively safe spaces for the humor to work. ii I take the phrase "frenzy of position taking" from the work on religion and telemedia by Jacques Derrida (2001) .
iii On the Salman Rushdie affair, which provides a parallel analysis for an earlier media environment, see Fischer 1990a see Fischer , reprinted in 1990b iv Hervick says that Bluitgen's claim was apparently made at a private dinner, and was used by a journalist present only some weeks later, and in turn was used by the Jylands-Posten, and was picked up by papers around the world without verifying if the claim was in fact true. In fact
Bluitgen did find an illustrator, and even a second after the first withdrew over Bluitgen's wanting a more detailed face. Hervick For a chronicle of events see Hervick ( vii Zizek, like Sloterdikj before him, has explored the dynamics of cynical reason, of doing things despite knowing their negativities, and of using the tools of the public media circuits in perverse ways. The notion of scandalous times refers to this last recursive and iterative, but non-direct, way of using and responding to the media flows, a theme he has been working. On a more ethnographically concrete case example, that of organ transplanation in India, see Lawrence
Cohen' wonderfully articulated article (1999).
viii Ad hominems are out of place here in arguments about the construction of the public sphere, but for any political analysis one must eventually also take under consideration the specific political interests that members of a public sphere bring along, their alliances and support structures, short term tactics versus long-term agendas (which of course can change ix The Bahomet image is a winged goat with female breasts and a torch between the goat horns.
In a positive gnostic interpretation, the composite body symbolized the burden of matter from which arose the repentance from sin. The Templar name is an acronym for"Templi omnium 
